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Abstract—NetSketch is a tool that enables the specification
of network-flow applications and the certification of desirable
safety properties imposed thereon. NetSketch is conceived to
assist system integrators in two types of activities: modeling
and design. As a modeling tool, it enables the abstraction of
an existing system so as to retain sufficient enough details
to enable future analysis of safety properties. As a design
tool, NetSketch enables the exploration of alternative safe
designs as well as the identification of minimal requirements
for outsourced subsystems. NetSketch embodies a lightweight
formal verification philosophy, whereby the power (but not the
heavy machinery) of a rigorous formalism is made accessible to
users via a friendly interface. NetSketch does so by exposing
tradeoffs between exactness of analysis and scalability, and
by combining traditional whole-system analysis with a more
flexible compositional analysis approach based on a strongly-
typed, Domain-Specific Language (DSL) to specify network
configurations at various levels of sketchiness along with
invariants that need to be enforced thereupon. In this paper,
we overview NetSketch, highlight its salient features, and
illustrate how it could be used in applications, including the
management/shaping of traffic flows in a vehicular network
(as a proxy for CPS applications) and in a streaming media
network (as a proxy for Internet applications). In a companion
paper, we define the formal system underlying the operation
of NetSketch, in particular the DSL behind NetSketch’s user-
interface when used in “sketch mode”, and prove its soundness
relative to appropriately-defined notions of validity.
I. MOTIVATION AND SCOPE
Traditionally, the design and implementation of trustworthy
systems follows a bottom-up approach, enabling system
designers and builders to certify (assert and assess) desir-
able safety invariants of the entire system in a wholistic
manner. For example, the development of applications with
predictable timing properties necessitated the use special-
purpose, real-time kernels so that timing properties at the ap-
plication layer (top) could be established through knowledge
and/or tweaking of much lower-level kernel details (bot-
tom), such as worst-case context switching times, specific
scheduling parameters, among many others. While justifi-
able in some instances, this bottom-up, vertical approach
to establishing trust does not lend itself well to current
practices in the assembly of complex, large-scale systems –
namely, the integration of various subsystems into a whole
by “system integrators” who may not necessarily possess
the requisite expertise (or knowledge of) the internals of
the subsystems they rely on. This horizontal approach to
system design and development has significant merits with
respect to scalability and modularity, but at the same time
it poses significant challenges with respect to aspects of
trustworthiness – namely, certifying that the system as a
whole will satisfy specific invariants (e.g., related to safety,
security, and timeliness). While it is possible to reason about
and/or automatically infer the exact (tight) conditions under
which safety constraints are satisfied for small-scale (toy),
fully-specified subsystems, the same cannot be expected
for large-scale, complex systems. Thus, in that context, we
recognize three specific challenges that the work we present
in this paper aims to mitigate.
Exposing Tradeoffs: The environments and tools supporting
large-scale system integrators must expose the inherent
tradeoff between the exactness of safety analysis with re-
spect to the specifity of the underlying subsystems, and the
computational complexity necessary for automated analysis.
For example, it should be possible for a system integrator to
under-specify, or sketch whatever guarantees or constraints
are expected to hold in a subsystem, and yet expect a
level of support for system-wide safety analysis that is
commensurate with the provided details. Such a capability
would enable system integrators to establish “minimal”
subsystem requirements for system-wide safety properties to
hold. Similarily, it should be possible for a system integrator
to escalate the automated analysis of safety properties based
on the computational cost of such an analysis, perhaps
opting for sketchier but cheaper analysis for less critical
functionalities (or early on in the design phase).
Lowering the Bar: Support for safety analysis in design
and/or development environments must be based on sound
formalisms that are not specific to (and do not require deep
knowledge of) particular domain expertise. As we alluded
earlier, while acceptable and perhaps expected for vertically-
designed, smaller-scale (sub)systems, deep domain expertise
cannot be assumed for designers of horizontally-integrated,
large-scale systems. Not only should the underlying for-
malism be domain-agnostic, but also it must be possible
for the formalism to act as a unifying glue across multiple
theories and calculi. In particular, such a formalism should
enable system integrators to manipulate results obtained
through multiple, less accessible domain-specific expertise
(e.g., using network calculus to obtain worst-case delay
envelopes, using scheduling theory to derive upper bounds
on resource utilizations, or using queuing theory to derive
steady-state average delays). In doing so, we lower the bar
of expertise required to take full advantage of such domain-
specific results at the small (subsystem) scale, while at the
same time enabling scalability of safety analysis at the large
(system) scale.
Enabling Compositional Network Flow Analysis: Most
large-scale systems are modeled/viewed as interconnections
of subsystems, or gadgets, each of which is a producer,
consumer, or otherwise a regulator of flows that are charac-
terized by a set of variables and a set of constraints thereof,
reflecting inherent or assumed properties or rules for how the
gadgets operate (and what constitutes safe operation). In a
way, we argue that system integration can be seen primarily
as a network flow management exercise, and consequently
that tools developed to assist in modeling and/or analysis
recognize and leverage this view by enabling compositional
analysis of networks of gadgets to allow for checking
of safety properties or for the inference of conditions or
constraints under which safe operation can be guaranteed.
Towards the above-mentioned goals, in this paper we
propose a methodology for the specification and analysis of
large network flow systems. In section II, we highlight the
prominent features of this methodology and of the formalism
upon which it is based. Next, in Section III, we present
a design (modeling and analysis) tool, called NetSketch,
which we have developed in support of this methodology. In
Sections V and VI, we present two illustrative use cases of
the tool for shaping vehicular traffic networks and streaming
video networks, respectively. We conclude the paper with a
review of the related literature in Section VII and with a
summary of current and future work in Section VIII.
II. THE NETSKETCH FRAMEWORK AND FORMALISM
In this section, we overview the salient features and the
formal underpinnings of NetSketch. A significantly more
detailed treatment of the formalism underlying NetSkecth
(including proof of its soundness) is presented in a compan-
ion paper [1].
Compositional Analysis in NetSketch: As a tool, Net-
Sketch supports compositional (in contrast to whole-system)
analysis, which is additionally incremental (distributed in
time) and modular (distributed in space). Schematically and
somewhat simplistically, we can constrast whole-system and
compositional analyses according to Figure 1, where “ [[x ]] ”
denotes “the analysis of object x”, “⌦” an associative opera-
tion for connecting two components of a larger network, and
“?” an associative operation for combining two analyses.
Here it is important to note that for an analysis to be
compositional, it must allow inter-checking of gadgets to
happen in any order, thus enabling more flexible patterns
of development and update. This stands in sharp contrast to
modular analysis, which may prescribe a particular order in
which the modules have to be analyzed.1
Analysis of Incomplete or Sketchy Specifications: By its
nature, whole-system analysis cannot be undertaken if a
gadget (such as B in Figure 1) is missing or if it breaks down
(indicated by the double question marks “??”). Moreover, if
the missing gadget is to be replaced by a new one (B0 in
Figure 1), whole-system analysis must be delayed until the
new gadget becomes available for examination and then the
entire network must be re-analyzed from scratch. If we are
interested in certifying that a particular invariant is preserved
throughout the network without running into the limitations
of whole-system analysis – specifically, inability to deal with
1A good example of the difference between modular and compositional
analysis is provided by type inference for ML-like functional languages.
Type inference is a particular way of analyzing programs statically, one of
several closely related approaches available today. ML-like type inference
is modular but not compositional.
Gadgets Whole-system vs Compositional analysis
A [[ A ]] = [[ A ]]
A⌦B [[ A⌦B ]] = [[ A ]] ? [[ B ]]
A⌦B ⌦ C [[ A⌦B ⌦ C ]] = [[ A ]] ? [[ B ]] ? [[ C ]]
A⌦ h i ⌦ C [[ A⌦ h i ⌦ C ]] ?? ?= [[ A ]] ? [[ h i ]] ? [[ C ]]
A⌦B0 ⌦ C [[ A⌦B0 ⌦ C ]] = [[ A ]] ? [[ B0 ]] ? [[ C ]]
. . . . . . . . .
Figure 1. Contrasting whole-system and compositional analyses.
incomplete or “sketchy” topologies and/or incurring the cost
of having to re-examine the entire network – and if we can
formalize this invariant using type-theoretic notions at the
interfaces of gadgets (denoted by h i in Figure 1), then we
can adopt the alternative approach of compositional analysis,
which is not invalidated by the presence of holes (the empty
interfaces h i in Figure 1). Simply put, one can think of
a “hole” as a placeholder where a system integrator can
place different gadgets satisfying the same interface types,
interchangeably and at different times.
Our schematic comparison above, between composi-
tional and whole-system analyses, calls for an important
proviso if we are to reap the benefits of the former. The
cost of combining two analyses (via the operation “?” in
Figure 1) should be significantly smaller – specifically,
below a computational complexity that is acceptable to the
user – than the cost of combining two networks (via the
operation “⌦” in Figure 1) and then analyzing the combi-
nation again from scratch. However, even with that proviso
and the additional proviso that all the pieces (gadgets) of
a network are in place so that a whole-system analysis is
at all an option, it will not be that compositional analysis
always wins over whole-system analysis. An analysis – any
analysis – is of a few properties of interest and, as such, an
abstraction of the actual network. An analysis determines
conditions under which the network can be operated safely
(relative to appropriately defined safety criteria). Within
the parameters and limits of the modeling abstraction, an
exact analysis is one that determines all conditions of safe
operation. An exact analysis typically requires whole-system
analysis and, as such, may be very expensive. But will its
cost always outweigh its benefits? It depends. Reverting to
a compositional and computationally feasible analysis may
force additional abstraction, at the price of perhaps exces-
sive and unacceptable approximation in the results, as we
shall illustrate later. An approximate analysis will typically
determine a proper susbet of the conditions of safe operation
and, as such, will be sound but not complete. The tradeoff
offered to users will be between completeness or precision
of results (typically via exact and whole-system analysis)
and computational feasibility (typically via approximate and
compositional analysis).
A Domain Specific Language (DSL) for Sketching Net-
work Flow Problems: Each junction (or node) of a network
may impose constraints on its respective inputs and outputs;
the topology coupled with its entire constraint set form
an exact model. A whole-system analysis of the network
must solve the constraint set for the given topology. Our
compositional approach uses types to approximate (i.e., are
sketched from) the constraints on each node’s interfaces. Our
DSL is used to describe the connectivity of nodes (and holes)
and to infer and check the types.
To illustrate and motivate the need for our DSL,
consider a particular network flow application, namely
vehicular-traffic networks, where types of interest are veloc-
ity types and density types. A simple version of such types
can be formalized as non-empty intervals over the natural
numbers, each denoting a range of permissible velocities
or a range of permissible densities. Velocity and density
types can be inferred in an inside-out fashion, starting from
the constraints regulating traffic at each of the nodes in the
network. Such constraints can be formalized as equalities
and inequalities of polynomial expressions over velocity and
density parameters.
Suppose M and N are traffic flow networks of some
sort – here “traffic flow” may equally refer to the flow
of packets in a communication networks, the flow of data
tupples in a stream database, or the flow of vehicles in a
network of roads. Suppose M has the same number n of
output (exiting) links as N has of input (entering) links, and
both are given as ordered sequences of length n. Suppose
M : (In1,Out1) and N : (In2,Out2) are typings of M and
N assigning appropriately defined types to their input/output
links. The formal syntax of our strongly-typed DSL will be
defined by rules of the form shown in Figure 2.
The side condition of the rule CONNECT2, as that of
every rule, is written right after it. To safely connect the
output links ofM to the input links of N , this side condition
requires that the output types of M are subtypes of the
corresponding input types of N . Figure 2 shows another
rule for the LET0 construct, which formalizes the idea that,
in a hole X of a network N , we can place at will any of n
different networks {M1, . . . ,Mn} as long as they satisfy
the same interface types.
The above two rules are presented to illustrate the
nature of NetSketch underlying formalism. Refinements
and generalizations of these two rules, as well as several
other rules, which we employ “under-the-hood” from within
the tool, constitute the formalism that underly NetSketch.
Collectively, they define the formal syntax of NetSketch’s
network flow DSL.2
With a DSL and constraints of the form just described,
we can enforce various desirable properties across, for
example, a vehicular-traffic network, such as no backups
(traffic is not piling up at any of the links entering a node
at any time), fairness (there is no link along which traffic
is permanently prevented from moving, though it may be
slowed down), conservation of flow (entering traffic flow in
a network is equal to exiting traffic flow), no gridlock (mu-
tually conflicting traffics along some of the links ultimately
result in blocking traffics along all links), etc.
There is more than one reasonable way of formalizing
the semantics of network typings. We consider two, corre-
sponding to what we call “weak validity” and “strong va-
lidity” of typed specifications. Let M : (In,Out) be a typed
specification for network M, where In is an assignment of
2Interested readers are referred to a companion paper [1] for a full
specification of the NetSketch formalism.
types to the input links and Out an assignment of types to
the output links:
• M : (In,Out) is weakly valid just in case, for every
traffic entering M, if the traffic satisfies the input
types In, then there is a way of channelling traffic
flow throughM, consistent with its internal constraints,
which will satisfy the output types Out.
• M : (In,Out) is strongly valid just in case, for every
traffic enteringM, if the traffic satisfies the input types
In, then every way of channelling traffic flow through
M, consistent with its internal constraints, will satisfy
the output types Out.
Both kinds of validity are meaningful. The first presumes
that nodes in the network communicate and cooperate, or
that there is a network administrator with global knowledge,
to optimally direct traffic through the network. The second
presumes instead that nodes in the network are autonomous
systems with restricted communication between them or
communication limited to their immediate neighbors. These
definitions are made precise and also more general, in [1],
including notions of soundness and its related proof.
From Modules and Gadgets to Network Sketches: In
our formalism, a module corresponds to the basic building
block of a flow network. Modules are fully specified in the
sense that exact (tight) constraints characterizing their safe
operation (e.g., invariants relating parameters associated with
their input and output links) are known a priori.3 NetSketch
gadgets are inductively defined: A module is a (base) gadget,
a hole is a gadget, and any interconnection of gadgets is itself
a (network) gadget. For ease of exposition, we use network
to refer to a network gadget.4
The definition of a network implies that (unlike mod-
ules), networks admit incomplete specification by allowing
for holes. More importantly, networks may be typed in the
sense that specific constraints or invariants at their interfaces
do not have to be exact – i.e., such type constraints may
allow for looser bounds than what is absolutely necessary.
As such networks can be seen as approximations of the
systems they model, and it is in that sense that they constitute
“sketches” of the system being modeled or analyzed. Such
approximations may arise as the result of trading off whole-
system for compositional analyses, and/or trading off exact-
ness of analysis for computational efficiency and scalability.
As we alluded before, exposing these tradeoff is one of the
main design goals of NetSketch.
III. THE NETSKETCH TOOL
A. Overview of NetSketch Operation
NetSketch presents its user with two modes of operation:
Base and Sketch. These modes reflect the granularity of
3The specific mechanism via which exact characterizations of modules
are acquired is an orthogonal issue: They may be the outcome of a whole-
system analysis using domain-specific theories or calculi; they may be
distilled from implementation artifacts; they may be lifted from data sheets;
or they may be simply assumed.
4While the formalism underlying NetSketch has a clear need to distin-
guish between modules and networks, in our presentation of the NetSketch
GUI, we use gadgets to refer to both, using the modifiers “Untyped” and
“Typed” to make clear whether we are referring to an exact specification
of an underlying subsystem, or to an approximate sketch thereof.
CONNECT2
  ` M : (In1, Out1)   ` N : (In2, Out2)
  ` M2N : (In1, Out2)
where if Out1 = h 1, . . . ,  ni and In2 = h⌧1, . . . , ⌧ni then  1 <: ⌧1, . . . ,  n <: ⌧n
LET0
  ` M1 : (In1, Out1) · · ·   ` Mn : (Inn, Outn)  , X : (In0, Out0) ` N : (In, Out)
  ` let X2 {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N : (In, Out)
where In1 = · · · = Inn = In0 and Out1 = · · · = Outn = Out0
Figure 2. Examples of two rules from NetSketch DSL Specification.
the description within the tool (Unyped and Typed) and
whether whole-system analysis or compositional analysis
will be employed, respectively. In the base mode of oper-
ation, NetSketch’s interface allows users to describe (typ-
ically small) exact specifications of gadgets consisting of
connected components for which whole-system analysis is
viable. In the sketch mode of operation, NetSketch allows
users to describe and explore network gadgets for which
compositional analysis is desired.
In the base mode of operation, a user defines a graph
topology by selecting from predefined classes of network
gadgets (of which he or she may define his or her own) and
by graphically drawing connections between these gadgets.
The topology of these gadgets and their respective edges
form a graph of constraints. Prior to entering the sketch
mode of operation, NetSketch performs an analysis of the
gadget constraint set, presenting the user with a simplified
(collapsed “black box”) representation of the gadget graph.
The sketch interface for this representation provides the user
with scalar bounds as input and output types derived from
the constraint set with respect to some specific target criteria.
Once in the sketch mode of operation, the user may further
refine or constrain the current network sketch (i.e., return to
the base (untyped) mode to consider other constraint crite-
ria), investigate the connection of other existing networks to
the current network, including the specification and analysis
of “holes” (placeholders for future gadgets) in the topology,.
An overview of the NetSketch operational process is
shown in Figure 3.
B. Manipulating Base (Untyped) Gadgets
The specification (modeling) of base gadgets in NetSketch
is done graphically through the placement and connection
of instances of gadget classes. Each gadget class defines
the number of ingress and egress ports for all gadgets
of this class, as well as the generic, relational constraints
between the inputs and outputs. For example, in a vehicular
traffic domain, a gadget class “Merge” may take two inputs,
produce one output and have the generic constraint that the
vehicular output density (i.e., number of vehicles) is equal
to the sum of the inputs (out0 = in0 + in1).
A user may define a base gadget (or a class of gad-
gets) on-the-fly within the tool and this gadget definition
can be used immediately or saved for future reuse. The
specific gadgets that are available for placement on the
canvas consist of those previously defined by users (or other
domain specific experts); users may ultimately build a library
of domain related gadget definitions that form a domain-
specific operating context.
The placement of a gadget class on the canvas creates a
gadget instance. The ports of a gadget instance are populated
with new constraint variables and generic constraints are
instantiated using these specific variables and asses to the
constraint set. When a user inserts a gadget instance, the
system immediately prompts a user to provide any specific
numeric bounds on these variables (if possible) to distinguish
a specific instance of a gadget from the generic class of
gadget. Requesting bounds for these variables immediately
makes the system slightly easier to use (as opposed to
requesting bounds for potentially hundreds of variables once
the specification is complete). Moreover, the system need
these bounds and must ensure that users provide them,
as good bounds decrease the likelihood of an unbounded
solution to the constraint set when types are to be produced.
Gadget instances may be connected to other gadget
instances on the canvas via edge placement. Edge placement
not only imposes equality constraints on the ports at the
tail of the edge and at the head of the edge, but for the
sake of readability, all references to the head variable in
the constraint set (and in the UI) are replaced with the tail
variable.
As a user places gadget and/or edges, he or she will
see the direct effects of these changes to the constraint set
presented in the bottom frame of the user interface. As is
reflected in the interface, the constraint set is stored with
respect to the gadget that introduced the constraint (or rather,
the gadget with which a specific constraint is associated)
such that if a gadget is removed from the topology, the
corresponding constraints may be removed as well. This is
also necessary to distinguish constraints from the head to
the tail in the event that an edge is deleted and the variables
need to be re-separated.
Beyond the stand-alone, direct definition and specifica-
tion of gadget classes, these classes may also be created
by folding connected gadget instances together to create a
reusable envelope: a visual simplification of a gadget topol-
ogy. An envelope is rendered as a single node that contains
all of the constraints of its constituent gadget and edges.
An envelope exposes all non-connected ports (both to and
from the collection of gadget) as inputs and outputs of the
envelope. The constraints for the gadget within the envelope
(and their edges) become the generic constraint set for the
envelope. In order to make the envelope sufficiently abstract,
some of the constraints that are automatically folded into the
envelope definition may need to be removed manually (i.e.,
specific bounds for some gadget instances may not apply
to the entirety of the envelope class). Envelopes are useful
both for abstracting particularly complex configurations of
gadget (i.e., complex or unwieldy topologies) and for the
promotion of reuse for commonly needed gadget instances.
For example, a user may easily create a 3-way merge by
connecting two merge gadget and exporting an envelope of
that model.
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Figure 3. A process overview of Network modelling and assessment with NetSketch.
C. Manipulating (Typed) Network Gadgets
Using this mode of operation involves the placement and
connection of Typed gadgets (and holes) into a Typed
Network. This enables a user to construct networks (i.e.,
interconnected, typed gadgets) and to explore their connec-
tivity and their interface properties. The presentation and
use of the simplified type-centric (interval) interface allows
a user to immediately see the range of valid inputs into a
network of typed gadgets and yet safely ignore the complete
set of constraints when connecting to other Typed gadgets or
networks. Again, we refer to a Typed Network as a collection
of Typed Gadgets that may contain holes, and trivially a
typed gadget is an instance of a typed network that just
lacks holes; as such the Typed Interface ultimately involves
sketching (composing) Typed Gadgets and Typed Networks
into larger Typed Networks.
To use an untyped gadget in typed mode, the NetSketch
tool performs an automated whole-system analysis on the
gadgets to produce types. While in the analysis phase, the
constraint solver will process the current constraint set and
will assign feasible bounds (if they exist) to constituent
gadgets. If the user specifies specific optimization criteria
(e.g., maximize a specific edge, verify that flow is conserved)
when converting an untyped gadget to a typed one, given
that optimization constraint, the solver will attempt to pro-
duce a feasible range with respect to that constraint. If no
constraints are specified, the analysis tool tries to find the
widest bounds (types) for the given untyped gadget. Should
the whole system analysis fail to find a feasible solution to
provide the basis for types, the user must either adjust the
gadgets or the target criteria.
Within the typed mode of operation, the user may
load other typed gadgets or networks from the repository
(or load and convert other untyped gadgets into gadgets)
and the system can suggest possible placement locations
(and restrict illegal placements) for new edges based on
the visible (and saved) type information of these gadgets.
This behavior in and of itself is exemplary of the benefit
of the type-centric interface: Depending on the shape of the
constraint set within the untyped Gadgets, it may not have
been possible to perform the same analysis when connecting
modules directly.
D. Transitioning from Untyped to Typed Modes
An important “decision point” for NetSketch users is the
determination of the point at which the user should abandon
whole-system (exact) analysis and switch to compositional
(sketched) analysis (i.e., transition from untyped to typed
modes of oepration). Similarly when converting an untyped
gadget of any size greater than one to a typed interface,
the user must choose the gadget granularity in the resulting
network (whether to make each untyped gadget an individual
typed gadget (i.e., node), to combine all gadgets into a single
typed gadget, or to make groupings of untyped gadgets into
typed gadgets).
While a user may decide to transition each individual
untyped gadget into a stand alone typed gadget for, say, a
preference for the simpler interface, this is clearly not nec-
essary. The typed network (compositional analysis) interface
loses some degree of specificity, so the time of transition and
related granularity should be chosen carefully. The correct
choice for such a fine granularity would be to experiment
with placing different gadgets (or gadget holes) in place of
other existing/defined gadgets.
Moreover, at some point the constraint sets in a topology
of untyped gadgets may get sufficiently complex such that
compositional analysis becomes the preferred (if not only)
possibility for analysis. We define this point as the constraint
threshold. The constraint threshold may be determined in
any number of ways that might be beneficial to the user (e.g.,
number of gadgets, number of edges, number of constraints,
number of variables within the constraints, time taken to
bound the feasible region of the solution, the shape of the
constraints). Presently, our implementation of NetSketch is
able to deal only with linear constraints, and as such, at this
time this threshold is is left as a manual switch to be selected
by the user.5
While not supported at this time, once an initial bounds
analysis has been performed, it would technically be possible
to export a typed gadget back to an untyped gadget. A
typed gadget can be viewed as an untyped gadget with an
extremely simplified constraint set, where the constraints
would be simple interval inequalities that reflect the types
discovered in analysis. This scenario is analogous to down-
casting in programming languages.
5Automatically determining a value for this threshold given the
shape/complexity of a constraint set (and the use of various non-linear
programming libraries) is planned.
E. Manipulating Holes
A hole is a placeholder for any unknown or under-specified
gadget or network. Holes enable modeling and verificaion
to proceed even if only part of the system is known. While
the specification of a topology with incomplete information
may seem contrived, many valuable usage scenarios for
NetSketch (and underlying formalisms) stem from the ability
to assess safe component replacement within existing topolo-
gies and the ability to determine the interface properties of
an unbound gadget or network so that other valid gadgets
(or combinations thereof) may be substituted.
NetSketch’s compositional analysis and verification en-
gine may be used to infer type constraints for any such holes
from the typed network and, in so doing, essentially indicates
which typed gadgets or networks may be later used in the
location of the hole. A hole might be used by the user as
a placeholder for a network for which he or she has partial
information, or an entirely unknown network (or series of
networks). The type system then can be used to specify
the valid range of values for that unknown network hole.
This usage of holes is inspired from (and directly analogous
to) the inference of types for variables in programming
languages. While NetSketch does not automate the searching
for and the suggestion of all possible gadgets that fit in a
given type signature, the tool will ultimately allow the user
to attempt to place a network into a hole, and will use type
information to permit or restrict such placement.
F. Implementation Details
NetSketch has been implemented in Java 1.6 and uses the
JGraphX (JGraph 6) Open Source graph drawing component
[2] libraries to facilitate graph visualization. To solve the
constraint sets that are built as a result of the composition
of modules in the GUI, we invoke the GNU Linear Pro-
gramming Toolkit (GLPK) [3], which can be used to solve
a system of constraints for linear programming and mixed
integer programming problems. The decision to use GLPK
is based on project maturity, community support and API
availability. At present we emit our constraints in the GNU
MathProg language and solve constraints on the local client
machine. Moving forward, we intend to solve constraints
remotely (using the client for a graphical interface only)
and may leverage a project such as the Optimization Ser-
vices project that defines an XML schema for optimization
problems, optimization solutions, and facilitates the remote
invocation of a solver to consume one and produce the other.
Such a move would also be related to our desire to support a
wider range of constraints (i.e., not just linear) in the module
composition phase.
IV. USE CASE 1: TASK SCHEDULING
The generality of the NetSketch formalism is such that it
can be applied to problems that are not immediately appar-
ent as constrained-flow network problems. For illustrative
purposes, consider a single processor scheduled via EDF.
Periodic tasks each require ci time units of computation
within their respective fixed periods of ti time units. A
simple notion of safety here is the schedulability test that
the sum of all utilizations (ci/ti) is less than or equal to
100%. One way to model this domain in NetSketch requires
two gadgets classes. The first gadget class required would
be used to represent the individual tasks to be scheduled;
this gadget class would have two inputs (one for ci and one
for ti) and would produce a single output representing ci/ti.
The second necessary gadget class accepts arbitrarily many
inputs and produces a single output. This gadget would have
a constraint that the output is equal to the sum of the inputs,
and another that reflects that the output is within the range
[0,100].6
Even with these simple constructs, one may consider
several interesting usage scenarios: (1) Swapping the schedu-
lability test gadget to that of another scheduling policy –e.g.,
a Rate Monotonic Scheduling policy, which would have a
constraint that the combined utilizations is <= n(2(1/n) 1);
(2) Investigating the remaining utilization of a task set by
generating types against a specific task set and then placing
a hole as an input to the test gadget; (3) Allowing the
“supply” of cycles, (i.e., total available utilization) to also be
an input of the gadget to model (e.g., a virtual server that is
able to produce x time units every y time units), requiring
more involved constraints. More complicated gadgets can
be constructed for richer task models (e.g., allowing for a
maximum number of deadlines over a window), virtualized
resources (e.g., periodic servers), as well as more elaborate
schedulers (e.g., statistical RMS, pinwheel scheduling).
V. USE CASE 2: VEHICULAR TRAFFIC
An engineer working for a large metropolitan traffic author-
ity has the following problem. Her city lies on a river bank
across from the suburbs, and every morning hundreds of
thousands of motorists drive across only a few bridges to get
to work in the city center. Each bridge has a fixed number of
lanes, but they are all reversible. This means that the operator
has the ability to decide how many lanes are available to
inbound and outbound traffic during different times of the
day. The engineer must decide how many inbound lanes
should be open in the morning with the goal of ensuring that
no backups occur within the city center, with the secondary
goal of maximizing the amount of traffic that can get into
the city.
The city street grid is a network of a large number of
only a few distinct kinds of traffic junctions: fork, merge,
and crossing junctions. We call streets with traffic going
into and out of a junction links. Both the structure of each
kind of junction and the problem the engineer must solve
can be modeled using (untyped) base gadgets. Once she has
specified the entire network, she may switch to a (typed)
network gadget; the types assigned to each gadget and the
links into and out of the typed network gadget can help her
decide how many lanes each bridge could have open while
ensuring no backups.
Example 1: A fork has one incoming link (call it 1) and
two outgoing links (call them 2 and 3). This traffic junction
can be modeled using a gadget (call it AF) consisting of a
6Scaling this range by 100 avoids non-integer values.
single node (call it F) for which the formal definition is:
N ={F}, In = h1i, Q = ?,Out = h2, 3i
Par ={1 7! v1 · d1, 2 7! v2 · d2, 3 7! v3 · d3}
Con =Connodes [ Conlinks where
Connodes = {regulating traffic through F}
Conlinks = {lower/upper on v1, d1 . . .}
This definition specifies the structure of the junction, with
the constraint set Con only containing predefined constraints
that are required for all fork gadgets:
(1) d1 = d2 + d3; (2) d1 ⇤ v1 6 d2 ⇤ v2 + d3 ⇤ v3
Constraint (1) enforces conservation of density when F
is neither a “sink” nor a “source”, whereas constraint (2) en-
codes the non-decreasing flow invariant, namely that traffic
along exit links may accelerate. Notice that constraint (1)
is linear constraint, while (2) is quadratic. Notice also that
these constraints are mutually consistent, i.e., simultaneously
satisfiable by a particular valuation (an assignment of values
to the 6 parameters d1, v1, d2, v2, d3, v3). Combined, these
constraints ensure that traffic is not piling up at the fork
entrance. Strictly speaking, we should also add a constraint
of the form: “If v2⇤d2+v3⇤d3 > 0 then v1⇤d1 > 0” or, given
that d1 = d2+d3, “If v2+v3 > 0 then v1 > 0”, i.e., if exiting
traffic flow 6= 0 then entering traffic flow 6= 0. Our syntax
of constraints does not allow the writing of conditional
constraints of this form. However, if we assume v1 6= 0, a
reasonable assumption, this conditional constraint is already
implied by constraints (1) and (2). The set Conlinks can be
used to specify lower and upper bounds on the parameters,
i.e., it consists of constraints of the form alop 6 vp 6 aupp and
blop 6 dp 6 bupp for p 2 {1, 2, 3}, where alop , aupp , blop , bupp are
particular scalar values.
It is worth noting that other meaningful constraints
could be introduced into the set of constraints to alter the
goal of the construction:
– Balanced densities at exits: d2 6 d3 6 d2 + 1
– Balanced flows at exits: d2 ⇤ v2 6 d3 ⇤ v3 6 d2 ⇤ v2 + 1
– Constant velocities from entry to exit: v1 = v2 = v3
– Conservation of kinetic energy: d1 ⇤v21 = d2 ⇤v22 +d3 ⇤v23
Before we specify the other two junction types, suppose
that the junction connected directly to a bridge is a fork
junction. A typed specification for the fork gadget would
consist of an assignment of types to the input and output
links. If the problem were trivial, containing only one bridge
and one junction, this type would specify exactly the bounds
that would guarantee no backups and could be used to decide
exactly how many lanes to open on the bridge.
Example 2: A merge junction has two incoming links
(call them 1 and 2) and one outgoing link (call it 3). The
corresponding gadget (call it AM) for this junction is very
similar to the fork module in Example 1. There is a single
node, call it M. The gadget is specified by the following six-
tuple (omitted details and justifications are similar to those
in Example 1):
N ={M}, In = h1, 2i, Q = ?,Out = h3i
Par ={1 7! v1 · d1, 2 7! v2 · d2, 3 7! v3 · d3}
Con =Connodes [ Conlinks where
Connodes = {regulating traffic through M}
Conlinks = {lower/upper bounds on v1, d1 . . .}
Example 3: A crossing junction has two incoming links
(call them 1 and 2) and two outgoing links (call them 3 and
4). The corresponding gadget (call it AX) again has a single
node, call it X, defined as follows:
N ={X}, In = h1, 2i, Q = ?,Out = h3, 4i
Par ={1 7! v1 · d1, 2 7! v2 · d2, 3 7! v3 · d3, 4 7! v4 · d4}
Con =Connodes [ Conlinks where
Connodes = {regulating traffic through X}
Conlinks = {lower/upper bounds on v1, d1 . . .}
The constraints regulating traffic through X can be of
different kinds, depending on different considerations, such
as whether or not the incoming traffics, through links 1 and
2, are given a choice to exit through link 3 or link 4. We
restrict attention in this example to the simple case when
there is no such choice: All traffic entering through link 1
must exit through link 3 and at the same velocity, and all
traffic entering through link 2 must exit through link 4 and
at the same velocity. This is expressed by four constraints:
v1 = v3; v2 = v4; d1 = d3; d2 = d4
If the total density of entering traffic, namely d1 + d2,
exceeds a “jam density” that makes the two entering traf-
fics block each other, there will be backups. We therefore
presume there is an upper bound, say 10, on d1 + d2 below
which the two traffics do not impede each other and there
are no backups as a result:
d1 + d2 6 10
Below a total density of 10, we can imagine that the two
incoming traffics are sparse enough so that they smoothly
alternate taking turns to pass through the crossing junction.
The modeling of a crossing in this example makes
all the constraints in Con linear. More complicated situa-
tions, enforcing additional desirable properties besides no-
backups, will typically introduce non-linear constraints such
as those listed in Example 1.
The entire city grid can be modelled by a network
N of connected instances of the typed gadget AF, AM,
and AX. The incoming edges of N would represent the
bridges. Since the constraints that restrict the intervals for the
link parameters in each individual gadget instance guarantee
no backups (thanks to the fact that the inference rules are
sound), this guarantee also holds for links of the composed
network N that consists of these gadget instances. Thus, as
soon as the best (widest) types are inferred for the incoming
links toN , the engineer can set the number of lanes of traffic
in a manner that respects these bounds and she can be certain
that no backups will occur in the city center.
It is possible that the types generated in this process will
not allow any traffic to flow into the city. In this situation, the
engineer always has the option of loosening the constraints
specified for each module, and trying again.
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Figure 4. The traffic module from Example 4, shown abstractly (top) and
from within NetSketch (bottom).
Example 4: This example is more complicated than
the preceding ones in this section. Consider our engineer
modelling a traffic module that represents the center of the
city, which is accessible by three inbound lanes and three
outbound lanes. The Untyped Gadgets that she connects
now (that will ultimately be the Network M) capture this
problem which builds on the previous three example gadgets.
M, consists of three nodes (gadgets) named A,B,C and
has 10 links named 1, 2, . . . , 10 (N = {A,B,C}, In =
h1, 2, 3i, Q = {4, 5, 6, 7},Out = h8, 9, 10i).
To complete the (untyped) specification of M, we
need to supply a function Par (assignment of parameters
to all links in In⇥ [ Q [ Out⇥) and a set Con (constraints
over these parameters). For simplicity in this example, we
restrict attention to density parameters, ignoring velocity
parameters. For the sake of brevity, rather than provide
a formal definition of Par (as in the previous examples),
gadget M, with every link assigned a density parameter, is
illustrated in Figure 4.
As in preceding examples, the constraints in Con specify
relationships between incoming and outgoing densities at
each junction, as well as lower and upper bounds on these
densities. The NetSketch GUI being used to define M is
shown in Figure 4 (bottom). The instance of B shown
is a user-defined gadget, while C which is shown as a
single node in Figure 4 (top) has been modeled in the
tool using two gadgets: a Merge junction and a Crossing
junction. While assembling the untyped gadgets, our user
has the following constraint set automatically constructed
(as defined by the shown gadget class):
d1 = d4 + d5 (A); d2 + d3 + d4 6 10 (B)
d2 + d3 = d6 (C); d2 + d3 + d5 6 10 (C)
Only the lower and upper bounds on the density parameters
(specific to these gadget instances) must be specified by our
engineer, and she is prompted to provide them after placing
each module on the canvas.
2 6 d1, d4, d5, d6 6 8 0 6 d2, d3 6 6
If our user decides to convert this untyped gadget topology
to a Typed Network to analyze the density bounds for traffic
into and out of the city center, the user supplied bounds alone
are insufficient. The user supplied bounds do not constitute
a valid type for the inputs and outputs of a Typed Network.7
Instead, the tool prompts our user for an objective function to
try to find a specific valid typing for each of the constituent
gadgets. Assuming the engineer’s city center is connected
to a large thoroughfare via d6, she may generate types that
abide by this request. Moreover, should she have models
of the rest of the city, but not the portion of roadway that
connects to d4, she may use a hole connected to d4 in her
Network and the tool will indicate what range of densities
would be expected to enter that hole in the event that d6 is
maximized.
VI. USE CASE 3: VIDEO STREAMING
As another use case of NetSketch, we consider the problem
of video stream aggregation into a constant bit rate pipe,
e.g., into the upstream bandwidth of a video server. To
safely serve a set of video streams, we must ensure that
in any period of time the set of video streams do not exhibit
an aggregate rate that is larger than that of the pipe. This
problem would be quite simple, if the bit rates of the video
streams were fixed. This is not the case for current video
encoding standards which exhibit highly variable bit rates
due to the different types of underlying frames (e.g., MPEG-
2/4 I, P, and B frames).
Let a(t) denote the cumulative number of bits for a
video stream. Two important parameters describing a video
stream are the mean bitrate and the peak bitrate defined as
follows:
Mean Rate =
a(tf )
tf
; Peak Rate =maxi
⇢
a(ti+1)  a(ti)
ti+1   ti
 
where ti indicates the time of the ith frame and tf is the
time of the last frame (it is assumed the stream starts a t1
= 0).
Using the stream’s mean rate for reserving resources is
not practical as it does not provide a small enough bound
on the playback delay and, potentially, may require a very
7For a more complete treatment of what it means for a type to be
invalid, weakly valid, strongly valid or optimal, we refer the reader to our
companion paper [1].
large buffer to avoid buffer underruns at the receiver. On
the other hand, while using the peak rate would give the
minimum playback delay and would minimize the amount
of buffering required, it is also wasteful of resources as
bandwidth utilization will be very low, making it impossible
to scale the system to a large number of streams. To deal
with this dilemma, one may use the effective bandwidth as
a way to characterize (using a tight constant rate envelope)
any time interval of the stream, so that the buffering delay
experienced during this interval is bounded. One way to
characterize the effective bandwidth is by specifying a rate
r for the stream as well as the maximum burst size s that
is possible under that rate as well as the minimum window
of time w necessary for such a burst to build up (which is
typically well defined for encoding standards – e.g., a GoP
for MPEG-2/4).
Here we note that for a given stream, multiple (r, s, w)
values may exist, underscoring a tradeoff between bandwidth
and delay. In particular, if r is the peak rate (as described
above) then there will be no need for any buffering at the
server, since there will always be reserved uplink capacity to
immediately serve the content, i.e., s = 0 and w = 1. Sim-
ilarly, if r is the mean rate (or less) then the corresponding
values of s and w will increase. In general one can see that:
r + s/w < rmax where rmax is the peak rate mentioned
above.
Aggregation Gadget: While in practice, one would be
interested in the aggregation of a set of video streams, the
basic building block we consider is that of aggregating two
video streams (or video stream aggregates) on a server.
Such a gadget would have two incoming links (In = h1, 2i)
and one outgoing link (Out = h3i). The incoming links
capture the properties of the two streams to be aggregated,
whereas the outgoing link captures the properties of the
aggregated stream. We note that the aggregation gadget
induces a relationship between the three links which could
be specified using the following relationships:
r3 = r1 + r2; s3 = s1 + s2; ; w3 = min(w1, w2)
Smoothing Gadget: Another operation that one may be
interested in performing on a video stream (or an aggregate
thereof) at the server is that of smoothing. Smoothing a video
stream is done through buffering (and hence introducing an
end-to-end delay). Thus, a smoothing gadget with a buffer
of size b would have one incoming link (In = h1i) and
one outgoing link (Out = h2i) subject to the following
constraint relating the characteristics of the incoming and
outgoing links:
r2 = r1; s2 = max(s1   b, 0); w2  w1
Transmission Gadget: Finally, in order to transmit a video
stream (or an aggregate of video streams) from the server
with a constant-bit-rate uplink capacity c, we define a gadget
with one incoming link (In = h1i) and one outgoing link
(Out = h2i) subject to the following constraint relating the
characteristics of the incoming and outgoing links:
r2 = r1; s2 = s1; w2 = w1; r1 +
s1
w1
 c
Example 5: Now, consider a user with an existing video
streaming network who wants to find out the “maximal”
stream that can be “inserted” without violating any existing
constraints of on-going streams. In its simplest form, this
could be an aggregation gadget where the output link as
well as one of the input links are “specified” (constrained),
leaving the second input link as a hole.
Example 6: As a second example, consider an aggre-
gated set of streams which need to be transmitted but, to
match the aggregate to the transmission link, the aggregate
must be smoothed through buffering. Notice that smoothing
reduces the size of the (aggregate) bursts, which in turn
reduces the requirement on the capacity of the transmission
gadget. In this topology a user designates a hole (i.e., an
unspecified smoothing gadget) ahead of the transmission
gadget and, given a particular capacity, we can find the
minimal smoothing necessary for the plumbing to work.
Notice that the constraints associated with the various
gadgets presented above are meant to exemplify safe con-
straints that could be asserted by a programmer or system
integrator. Needless to say these constraints could be refined
and/or made “tighter” (i.e., more permissive). Moreover,
by introducing additional “variables” (e.g., delay or loss
rates), the gadgets could be made more truthful to specific
implementation details, e.g., using concepts from Network
Calculus to establish relationships between flows. Needless
to say, the simplicity of the constraints we use is for ease
of presentation and not a reflection of the capabilities of
NetSketch and its DSL to deal with more elaborate constraint
sets. Indeed, NetSketch’s ability to deal with constraints
at multiple levels of details (a.k.a., sketchiness) is one of
NetSketch’s salient features.
VII. RELATED WORK
Most previously proposed systems for reasoning about
the behavior of distributed programs (Process algebra [4],
Petri nets [5], ⇧-calculus [6], finite-state models [7], [8],
[9], and even model checking [10], [11]) rely upon the
retention of relatively high degrees of detail about the
internals of a system’s components in order to assess their
interactions with other components. While this certainly
affords these systems great expressive power, that expres-
siveness necessarily carries with it a burden of complexity.
Such an approach is inherently unmodular in its analysis,
in at least two ways. First, because details are not easily
added to or shed from a representation or model when it
is compared and interfaced with another, the specification
of components must be highly coordinated for global anal-
ysis to be possible; the specifications are often wedded to
particular methodologies and not sufficiently general to be
amenable to multiple analysis approaches and interaction
with differently-specified systems. Second, it is not generally
possible to analyze portions of a system independently and
then, without reference to the internals of those portions,
assess whether they can be assembled together.
The capabilities to construct, model, infer, and visualize
networks and properties of network constraints provided
by NetSketch are similar to the capabilities and interfaces
provided by modelling and checking tools such as Alloy
[12]. Unlike Alloy, that can be used to model and check
constraints on sets and relations, NetSketch focuses on pro-
viding more specific capabilities involving directed graphs.
One of the essential functionalities of NetSketch is the
ability to reason about, and find solution ranges that respect,
sets of constraints that happen to describe properties of a
network. In its most general form, this is known as the
constraint satisfaction problem [13] and is widely studied
[14]. NetSketch types are linear constraints, so one variant
of the constraint satisfaction problem relevant to our work
is when the constraints under consideration are all linear.
Finding solutions to linear constraints is a classic problem
that has been considered in a large variety of work over the
decades. There exist many documented algorithms [15, Ch.
29] and analyses of practical considerations [16]. However,
the typical approach is to consider a homogenous list of
constraints of a particular class. A distinguishing feature
of NetSketch and the underlying formalism is that it does
not treat the set of constraints as monolithic. Instead, a
tradeoff is made in favor of providing users a way to manage
large constraint sets through abstraction, encapsulation, and
composition. Complex constraint sets can be hidden behind
simpler constraints – namely, NetSketch types, which are
linear constraints that are varyingly restricted to make the
analysis tractable – in exchange for a potentially more
restrictive solution range, and the conjunction of large con-
straint sets is made more tractable by employing composi-
tional techniques.
The work in this paper extends and generalizes our
earlier work in TRAFFIC (Typed Representation and Analysis
of Flows For Interoperability Checks [17]), and comple-
ments our earlier work in CHAIN (Canonical Homomorphic
Abstraction of Infinite Network protocol compositions [18]).
CHAIN and TRAFFIC are two distinct generic frameworks for
analyzing existing grids/networks, and/or configuring new
ones, of local entities to satisfy desirable global properties.
Relative to one particular global property, CHAIN’s approach
is to reduce a large space of sub-configurations of the
complete grid down to a relatively small and equivalent
space that is amenable to an exhaustive verification of the
global property using existing model-checkers. TRAFFIC’s
approach uses type-theoretic notions to specify one or more
desirable properties in the form of invariants, each invariant
being an appropriately formulated type, which are preserved
when interfacing several smaller subconfigurations to pro-
duce a larger subconfiguration. CHAIN’s approach is top-
down, TRAFFIC’s approach is bottom-up.
NetSketch leverages a rigorous formalism for the speci-
fication and verification of desirable global properties while
remaining ultimately lightweight. By “lightweight” we mean
to contrast our work to the heavy-going formal approaches
– accessible to a narrow community of experts – which are
permeating much of current research on formal methods and
the foundations of programming languages (such as the work
on automated proof assistants [19], [20], [21], [22], or the
work on polymorphic and higher-order type systems [23],
or the work on calculi for distributing computing [24]). In
doing so, our goal is to ensure that the formalisms presented
to NetSketch users are the minimum that they would need to
interact with, keeping the more complicated parts of these
formalisms “under the hood”.
VIII. CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK
NetSketch’s current constraint system for untyped gadgets
(which is limited to linear constraints) is intended to be
a proof-of-concept to enable our work on typed networks
(holes, types and bounds). We intend to expand the current
constraint set that is supported within the tool to include
more complex constraints. Closely related to this is the need
to assess systems of non-trivial (i.e., non-linear) constraints
automatically for the sake of determining the threshold
automatically. Finally, with respect to constraint satisfaction,
we intend to decouple the solver from the client to enable
much greater model processing power (e.g., running on
multiple machines in the cloud) accessible from lightweight
clients.
As indicated in the accompanying paper on the Net-
Sketch formalism [1], there is no natural ordering of types
for sketches. When no optimal constraint function is pro-
vided, conversion from untyped gadget to a typed gadget
may produce multiple different valid types. Types can be
considered optimal based on the size of their value ranges
(e.g., a larger input range and smaller output range is
preferable, as is typically the case with type systems), yet
multiple “optimal” typings may exist. The algorithm that we
use to assign types should be amended to try to establish a
weight for various valid typings.
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